Shame and Philosophy: An Investigation in the Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics

'Phil Hutchinson offers an incisive, insightful and deeply humane New Wittgensteinian critique of a number of influential accounts of the emotions, including shame. That too many philosophers have marginalized the 'person' in their accounts – that they have forgotten the place of the emotions in human lives and in the life-world – is the shame of philosophy.'
- Katherine Morris, Oxford University

'A fine work: not only does it provide convincing answers to important questions, it also reveals the limitations - and cures some of the blindspots - of much contemporary research on emotions. The discussion of cognitivism is particularly subtle, while the perspicuous presentation of the lived experience of shame might help to resolve some crucial theoretical aporias about the nature and the significance of being a person.'
- Anthony Hatzimoysis, The University of Manchester
 
'Hutchinson's book is a thoughtful, thorough and interesting work. He offers many striking reflections on emotion, language and, specifically, shame. In showing how different conceptions of emotions are based on problematic conceptions of language, he also goes much deeper than philosophers usually when they write about this subject.'
- Ylva Gustafsson, Philosophical Investigations

'Shame and Philosophy is an engaging philosophical effort to explore reflection about emotion with its relevant connection to personhood. Phil Hutchinson offers a careful reflection that establishes a dialogue among current research both from the analytical and the continental traditions. This novel approach to philosophy of emotions provides, just like Hutchinson wants, a conceptual network for a better understanding of how emotions make up our world.'
- Dina Mendonça, Metapsychology online


Abstract
In an important contribution to the burgeoning area of philosophy of emotions, Phil Hutchinson engages with philosophers of emotion in both the analytic and continental traditions. Shame and Philosophy advances a framework for understanding emotion: world-taking cognitivism. He argues that reductionist accounts of emotion leave us in a state of poverty regarding our understanding of our world and ourselves. The book contains detailed engagements with theorists of emotions such as Peter Goldie, Paul Griffiths, Jesse Prinz and Jenefer Robinson as well as a chapter on the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, which also contains a detailed critical engagement with Jacques Derrida's work. The Chapter on Griffiths' work also contains a detailed critique of the program of natural kind semantics. As the book progresses it becomes more and more concerned to meditate on shame as discussed by Primo Levi and other survivors of extreme trauma. The book moves towards conclusion by suggesting further directions for study.

There is no Such Thing as a Social Science

Co-Authored with Wes Sharrock and Rupert Read

    The death of Peter Winch in 1997 sparked a revived interest in his work with this book arguing his work suffered misrepresentation in both recent literature and in contemporary critiques of his writing. Debates in philosophy and sociology about foundational questions of social ontology and methodology often claim to have adequately incorporated and moved beyond Winch's concerns. Re-establishing a Winchian voice, the authors examine how such contentions involve a failure to understand central themes in Winch's writings and that the issues which occupied him in his Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy and later papers remain central to social studies.

      The volume offers a careful reading of the text in alliance with Wittgensteinian insights and alongside a focus on the nature and results of social thought and inquiry. It draws parallels with other movements in the social studies, notably ethnomethodology, to demonstrate how Winch's central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined.